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MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY IN EUROLAND
Abstract
In this paper we propose an aggregate measure of income inequality for the founding
countries of the European monetary union. Applying the methodology of the Theil index
we are able to derive a measure for Euroland as a whole by exploiting information from
two data sets: the European Community Household Panel and the Luxembourg Income
Study. The property of additive decomposability allows us to determine each country's
contribution as well as that of each demographic group to overall income inequality. In
addition the impact of government transfers on this inequality measure is assessed.3
1 Introduction
With the start of the European monetary union on the first of January 1999, all eleven
participating states now share a single currency. They have achieved an important
milestone in becoming a single economic unit which we shall refer to as  Euroland
1.
However, this one event should not distract from the fact that there still remain
considerable economic, cultural as well as important social differences between the
participating nations.
With the present paper we hope to shed some additional light on this issue by estimating
an aggregate measure of income inequality within  Euroland. We are interested in the
income distribution in Euroland as one indicator of the current state of a European social
union. Real income distribution comparisons are of interest to policy makers because
many people, not only as members of the current monetary but especially as potential
members of a social union, see themselves increasingly as residents of a single Euroland.
Therefore research on the current state of social cohesion within this area is needed to
provide a base point for developing and evaluating policy options down the line.
The scientific literature on this subject can be classified into three fields of research. The
first field focuses on empirical inequality measurement in general. In recent years much
progress has been made thanks to new databases such as the Luxembourg Income Study.
Examples for surveys of this literature are Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) and
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997, 1998)
2. The second major field is concerned with real
income comparisons
3. Work in this field includes Atkinson (1995),  Gottschalk and
Smeeding (1997, 1998) and Rainwater and Smeeding (1995). Gottschalk and Smeeding
(1997, 1998) present estimates of absolute income inequality in different industrialized
                                                                
1 The eleven founding members of  Euroland include in alphabetical order Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Out of the 15 member
states of the European Union (EU) only Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the UK are not part of the European
Monetary Union (EMU).
2 Further literature is listed on the LIS homepage at www.lissy.ceps.lu.
3  Theil (1989) distinguishes two basic categories for making cross-country comparisons. International
income inequality ignores the within country inequality and compares only the countries’ per capita
income. „We obtain world inequality from international inequality by adding the average within-country
inequality“ (Theil 1989). Our approach can be assigned to the latter field of world (in our case Euroland)
income inequality.4
countries, however focussing on a different set of countries. In Rainwater and Smeeding
(1995) the real income of children in different industrialized countries is compared. The
article closest in spirit to the present paper is Atkinson (1995). He also constructs a
measure of Europe-wide income distribution but using a quite different method. Atkinson
did not employ micro-data but instead “tried the experiment of estimating the overall
distribution from national ‘meso-tables’, in that the population is divided into 40 groups
of equal size (20 groups in the case of Finland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), ranked
according to their equivalent disposable income, where it is assumed that incomes are
equal within each group” (Atkinson (1995), p. 13). His work also differs from ours with
respect to the definition of Europe (we do not include Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and
United Kingdom but do include Austria) and also with respect to the level of
disaggregation  since we draw on the original micro-data. The third and last line of work
we refer to deals with the theory of inequality index numbers. This literature is concerned
with a specific property of inequality measures, namely additive decomposability, as
advanced by Berry,  Bourguignon and Morrison (1981, 1983),  Bourguignon (1979),
Cowell (1980), Shorrocks (1980), Theil (1967, 1979a, 1979b) and Yoshida (1977).
Our study adds to this earlier research by explicitly focussing on inequality in the
Euroland countries together and in the methodology to be applied. We will compare real
household equivalent incomes across countries and it is our principal objective to
aggregate the inequality measures into a single inequality measure for  Euroland as a
whole. We believe that such measures will be an essential part of future discussion about
a European social union. The major difference of our study is the special focus we
employ on a hypothetical  Euroland around the mid-1990s. Using data from Wave 2
(1995) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) together with data from the
Luxembourg income study (LIS) in the mid 1990s, inequality in every single country will
be measured as will be overall inequality of household equivalent income in Euroland. Of
course at that point in history one could only speak of the group of countries that would
ultimately form a future Euroland. Documenting the heterogeneity of the social structures
of the individual states at a time when a prospective monetary union just came into view
is nevertheless most interesting, especially with regard to the current discussion about
potential future entry of the non-participating countries (the remaining EU countries5
Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom as well as Eastern European
countries joining the EU). We believe that our attempt to aggregate national inequality
measures for Euroland constitutes a genuine contribution since it exploits methodology
used to analyze inequality in regions of flexible size like Euroland that will admit new
members in the foreseeable future. To our knowledge this could very well be the first
approach to quantify aggregate inequality in Euroland at a time when information about
social structures in Euroland is still rather limited.
We use a summary measure of the generalized entropy family of inequality indices, the
Theil inequality index, due to its distinct advantage of being an additively decomposable
measure. This property allows us to derive an inequality index for Euroland as a whole, in
spite of the fact that complete information on all participating countries in the data sets is
not available. Applying the methodology of the Theil index we are still able to compute a
measure for Euroland income inequality when we combine data of the ECHP, that do not
include Finland, with LIS-data that do not include Portugal.
Additive decomposability further allows us to determine each country's and household's
contribution to overall income inequality in  Euroland. By using an  additively
decomposable measure, we can compare the country effect and the household structure
effect within each country with the Euroland average and assess the relative contribution
of both effects.
Finally we analyze the redistributive impact of transfer policies in the different Euroland
countries for different inequality measures upon (aggregate)  Euroland inequality. By
comparing the distributions of net total incomes (including governmental and social
insurance transfers) with pre-transfer (but post-tax) incomes are able to estimate the
effectiveness of government transfers in the Euro countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: we begin with a discussion of real income comparisons
across countries along with an introduction to the data sets used. Next the methodology of
measuring income inequality with an additively decomposable measure is described. We
then present the results for overall inequality in  Euroland and a decomposition of this
index with respect to the Euro countries. This is followed by a decomposition by
countries as well as demographic groups to investigate their respective contributions to6
measured inequality in Euroland. In addition the effect of social transfer payments on the
distribution of income will be analyzed. The paper concludes with a summary of the main
findings.
2 Concepts and Data
Since a comparison of income distributions across countries raises a host of problems and
important issues, we want to be sure that we know what it is precisely that we want to
measure. Second, choices must be made to achieve comparability among people living in
households of different sizes and in different countries.
Our analysis limited to the distribution of disposable money income. That is, rather than
basing measured inequality on consumption or expenditure data, we take total annual
household income after taxes and transfer payments as our chosen indicator for
differences in the access to economic resources or achievable economic well-being. Since
we are particularly interested in comparing real income levels across all countries that
constitute  Euroland we first have to transform all incomes into comparable monetary
values in an appropriate manner. All income amounts have been reported in national
currency units and are converted to a comparable base using the multilateral purchasing
power parities provided by Eurostat for the reference year.
4
We measure income as household equivalent income, i.e. adjusted for family size. The
unit of analysis is the individual to whom we assign an equivalent household income
according to the modified OECD scale
5. Insofar as household structures differ across
countries, the choice of the equivalence scale may indeed affect the result of the income
comparison. This problem is taken care of by sensitivity analyses using different scales.
We multiply the household equivalent income by the number of individuals in each
household, thereby assuming that within each family an equal share of income is
allocated to each member. Thus we do not take into account the possibility of unequal
                                                                
4 In sensitivity analyses different conversion rates have been used to transform national currencies into
ECU (in particular ECU exchange rates from 1994 and EURO exchange rates from 1999), but these turn
out  not to have a substantial effect on the final measure.
5 With the modified OECD scale a weight of 1 is assigned to every household member above the age of 16.
Every additional adult (person over 16) receives the weight 0.5 and each child under 16 receives the weight
0.3.7
sharing within the household. While clearly a very strict assumption, this is standard
assumption in income distribution research typically little or no information is available
about income distribution within families.
6
Since time spent in gainful employment is in most cases not the sole productive activity
of a household, it would be necessary to also account for the yields of household
production, as for instance the value of a cooked meal or a well-educated child and not
just market income. However in the present study household production is ignored due to
data constraints. For this reason the results need to be interpreted cautiously as inequality
might be overestimated when there are households in which home-produced goods make
up a major share of a family’s total real consumption. In a comparison of inequality
measures across countries the respective relevance of household production should be
kept in mind when interpreting differing indices.
A very rich and only recently issued data set to investigate the distribution of income
across European countries is provided by the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). To meet the demand for greater in-depth knowledge and better compatibility of
data on social and economic conditions in the European Union, the ECHP was launched
as a closely coordinated component of a system of household surveys aimed at generating
comparable social statistics at the EU level. The ECHP is a standardized survey
conducted in Member States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical
Office of the European Communities
7. It involves annual interviewing of a representative
panel of households and individuals in each country, covering a wide range of topics on
living conditions. The ECHP includes comparable information across Member States
regarding income, work and employment, poverty and exclusion, housing, health and
many other social indicators. The key feature of the ECHP is harmonization of its
methodology, specifically through the creation of a centralized questionnaire that serves
as the point of departure for all national surveys. Although this common questionnaire
                                                                
6 It should be noted that by focussing on disposable money income we ignore two factors that also affect
family well-being and may vary widely across countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1998). The first is any
sort of in-kind income including private and publicly provided goods. The second concerns indirect
taxation.
7 For a detailed description of the ECHP methodology and questionnaires see Eurostat 1996, The European
Community Household Panel (ECHP): Volume 1- Survey methodology and Implementation and  The8
ensures a common conceptual framework and comparability of the national surveys, it
does not necessarily imply the use of identical questions among countries. On the
contrary, because of differing legal and institutional frameworks, the same information,
e.g. on income and social transfers, is sometimes provided by very different questions
(Eurostat 1998).
To assess the quality of the ECHP, data comparisons with other EU and national sources
have been made (Eurostat 1998). Income distribution in the ECHP, the most important
feature for our analysis, has been compared with the national consumption and
expenditure surveys showing that the overall mean income level is higher in the ECHP.
But the differences are only marginal and they are most pronounced in those countries
where the consumption-expenditure survey is known to be of limited quality with respect
to income data (Eurostat 1998).
To study income inequality in  Euroland we need income data on all eleven founding
members of the European monetary union. Since to date only waves 1 and 2 of the
ECHP, gathered in 1994 and 1995, are available, information for Finland is lacking,
because it first joined the ECHP in 1996. For this reason we draw on data from the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
8. The LIS is a collection of micro data sets obtained
from a range of income surveys in various countries. Information on income and
household characteristics has been made comparable to improve consistency across
countries. Thus the major difference between the ECHP and the LIS is that while the LIS
data provide information that has been drawn from national surveys and made
comparable ex post, the ECHP has been started with a common conceptual framework
and standardized content from the very beginning.
With both data sets, the 1995-wave of the ECHP for ten of the Euro countries and the
1995-LIS file on Finland, we have assembled all the ingredients required to estimate an
inequality measure for Euroland as a whole.
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP): Volume1 – Survey questionnaires: Wave 1-3 – Theme 3,
Series E, Eurostat, OPOCE, Luxembourg, 1996.
8 Further information at www.lissy.ceps.lu. See particularly de Tombeur and O’Connor (1995).9
3 Methodology
We now turn our attention to the central methodological problem of this paper. After
transforming all nominal incomes into real incomes we must choose an appropriate
summary measure to make our comparisons.
In the present paper we limit our attention to an index from the generalized entropy
family of inequality indices
9. The specific summary measure used here is commonly
called the Theil inequality index T(1). We choose the T(1) index because of the underlying
analogy between the concepts of disorder (or entropy) and inequality



























where N is the size of the population, yi is individual income, and m is the mean income of
the population. According to Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980) or Shorrocks (1980) the
T(1) measure can be decomposed such that
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The first term describes inequality within each of the K population subgroups. In our case
subgroups correspond to different countries and different household types within Euroland.
The second term measures inequality between these subgroups, using sk as the share of total
income of subgroup k. The income share sk can be interpreted as the economic weight in the
total population. From (2) it follows that apart from the value of inequality within subgroups
                                                                
9 For an overview of the numerous summary measures for inequality available in the literature see for
example Jenkins (1991) or Slottje (1989).
10 The Theil measure takes the average of reciprocal income shares weighted by income shares. The
rationale for this specific functional form requires an excursion to information theory which is concerned
with valuing the knowledge that an outcome, one of many possible, has occurred. Finally the analogy
between the concepts of disorder (entropy) in information theory and of inequality provides the rationale
for using such an index in the context of inequality measurement. For details see the seminal contribution
by Theil (1967) or a shorter exposition in Jenkins (1991).10
T(1)k, inequality depends on mean income levels mk and population sizes Nk. Hence, once
we have the countries' inequality indices, all we need to determine overall inequality are
these aggregate macroeconomic numbers.
The generalized entropy family in general and the Theil index T(1) in particular satisfy the
axioms of symmetry (anonymity), population replication (population homogeneity,
replication invariance), mean independence (invariance to relative changes, scale invariance,
homogeneity), the Dalton-Pigou principle of transfers (strong principle of transfers) and
additive decomposability. The last property implies that an overall inequality measure can
be additively decomposed into its subgroups' distinct inequality measures as has been shown
in (2) above
11.
Additive decomposability is the condition we impose when choosing our inequality
measure
12. Of course, there are objections in that it requires a certain degree of
independence between subgroups. It is not entirely intuitive why inequality in one group
should be independent of inequality in another group. But in this particular case the different
groups represent different countries. Here it seems sensible to allow inequality in Germany
to be independent of inequality, say, in Portugal. Whether the assumption of independence
still holds with the introduction of a common currency and monetary policy in 1999 is a
subject for further discussion. In the words of Cowell (1998), the property displayed in (2)
suggests a “natural  cardinalization” of decomposable measures. In our context, it is an
appropriate decomposition for revealing the pattern of inequality in Euroland.
Instead of calculating the T(1) index an alternative choice would be the T(0) index –also
called the mean logarithmic deviation which has the property of being even more bottom
sensitive than the T(1). We choose the T(1) index because our main purpose is to draw a
                                                                
11 Two remarks about other often used axioms are in order here. First, T(1) is not normalized between 0 and 1
so it does not satisfy the axiom of normalization. Dividing T(1) by ln(N) achieves normalization. Second, T(1)
is bottom-sensitive because observations are weighted by the size of their incomes, i.e. the axiom of transfer
sensitivity is satisfied at the bottom end of the distribution. A 100 ECU transfer from someone with 100,000
ECU to someone with 90,000 ECU would alter T(1) by as much as one from someone with 10,000 ECU to
someone with 9,000 ECU. The change in T(1) depends on the relative incomes of the households involved in
the transfer. Whether this implicit form of sensitivity to transfers in the T(1) measure is the appropriate one
remains of course subject to discussion.
12 The priority of additive decomposability is the reason for using the non-normalized T(1) measure, i.e. in
our case maximum possible inequality in a group depends on population size. The intuition behind this is
that a society with a million people where one person receives all income is more unequal than a society
with one thousand inhabitants where one person receives the total income.11
picture of the income distribution in  Euroland and not evaluate the effectiveness of
distribution policies. The crucial advantage of the T(1) measure for the analysis presented
here lies in its use of economic weights or income shares instead of using sole population
shares (as in the T(0) measure). While population shares are part of income shares as can be
seen from (2) the latter also include relative mean incomes. We consider economic weights
or income shares more appropriate since they better reflect countries' economic standings in
terms of political power within the EMU than pure population sizes.
Indices other than those belonging to the Theil family do not satisfy what Cowell (1998)
labels the “accountant’s approach” to decomposition, meaning that the weighted within-
group inequality terms together with the between-group inequality term sum to unity a very
useful property in our context. This accounting property illustrates that the overall inequality
is not just the simple sum of individual inequalities in which case it would be sufficient to
look at the differences of individual inequality measures to evaluate the degrees of
heterogeneity between countries. However, when viewing all countries together as a single
entity, overall inequality is the sum of weighted inequality indices and appropriately
measured between-group inequality. In view of the economic and social process of
integration that is reflected in a single European market and a single European Currency
area we think it worthwhile to consider inequality within  Euroland as a whole. For this
reason we look at real rather than nominal inequality as usually done in the scientific
literature.
One major reason why we actually need additive decomposability to be satisfied is that
Euroland consists of eleven countries. In the 1995-wave of the ECHP, however, Finland
was not yet included in the data set. As a consequence we first have to calculate a proxy
measure for overall  Euroland inequality including only ten countries, i.e. with Finland
missing. The value of this "Euro10"-Theil index then has to be adjusted by Finland's
contribution to total inequality by exploiting additional information provided by the LIS.
It is at this point where the properties of the Theil index T(1) come into play: the Theil
index can be calculated with aggregate data, in particular the population share, the mean
income and the Theil (inequality) index of every population subgroup as shown in (1) and
(2). Hence, if we dispose of T(1) indices of all participating nations as well as their12
respective population shares and mean incomes, we can simply "sum" everything
according to equation (2).
Looking closer at the changes that result when integrating a new country into an existing
entity, we can discriminate four effects:
(3)   
( ) [ ]
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where subscript k represents subgroup k as before and superscript K represents the total
number of all K subgroups.
One direct (positive) effect from adding another country with inequality T(1)K+1  is quite
obvious when inspecting (2). Technically speaking we are now summing over ( K+1)
groups instead of K groups. As long as the added country has at least some degree of
inequality, i.e. (T(1)K+1 >0), aggregate inequality will always be greater in the new bigger
entity. This direct inequality effect is captured by the first term in equation (3) above. The
sign of term II depends on the relative size of the new country's mean income level mK+1
with respect to that of the existing entity (mK+1„m
K). If the entrant's mean income is larger,
there will be a positive mean income effect, otherwise we will observe a negative impact
on aggregate inequality.
Effect III and IV are both re-weighting effects. The third term is unambiguously negative.
When adding another country, overall population and overall mean income will be
altered. This again will affect the weights assigned to the existing (old) countries. Since
every country k is weighted by its economic share sk, its contribution to overall inequality
will always be smaller in the new bigger entity. As a result the re-weighting inequality
effect III and the direct inequality effect I work in opposite directions. The sign of the last
term IV is ambiguous again. It depends on the relation between the new overall mean
income and the old overall mean income which we can call the re-weighting mean
income effect. If the entrant's income level leads to a rise in overall mean income, the re-13
weighting mean income effect will be negative. It will be positive if a relatively poor
country enters. As a result, the sign of the combined effect of the four partial effects
remains also unclear, i.e. it is not determined ex-ante.
In our example of  Euroland we can now assess empirically what the net effect will be
when adding the data from Finland to the inequality measure based on the ECHP data set.
Calculating the Euro10-Theil according to equation (2) generates an inequality index of
0.1849. Integrating Finland's income and population data with reference to equation (3)
then yields an overall Euro-Theil of 0.1831.
13 On the right hand side of equation (4) we
can discriminate the following four effects:
(4)  0.1831 - 0.1849 = 0.0018 + 0.0016 - 0.0033 - 0.0018.
The resulting net effect of including Finland is thus -0.0018, i.e. there is less than one
percent difference between the two indices
14. The direct inequality effect (first term), the
between-group or mean income effect (second term) and the re-weighting inequality
effect (third term) more or less level each other out. So the major part of the overall
change can be attributed to between-group re-weighting caused by a higher overall mean
income after integrating Finland into our empirical Euroland (fourth term).
This analysis gives us an impression of the mechanics behind the Theil T(1) inequality
measure that relies on differences not only in incomes but also in population sizes. The
property of additive decomposability has been exploited to construct a measure for
inequality in Euroland as a whole. We find this measure not to differ very much from the
Euro10-Theil calculated for only those ten countries included in the ECHP. This finding
allows us to focus our further analyses on those ten countries using the Euro10 results as
a proxy for the structure of the income distribution within all of Euroland.
                                                                
13 For a comparison, note that the US-Theil index calculated using LIS-data from 1994 amounts to 0.2289.
14 We use a one percent rule of thumb as a rough substitute for more rigorous statistical inference that must
await future work. The small differences in the T(1) measures may not come as a surprise since Finland is a
very small country with a population share of less than two percent of the Euroland population. The same
holds true for the income share. Furthermore Finland is consistently found to be one of the less unequal
countries in international comparisons as for example in Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995).14
4 The structure of income inequality in Euroland
Having constructed and evaluated a measure of overall inequality in Euroland we are now
interested in determining the various sources of this income inequality. How much does
each nation contribute to the overall inequality index of 0.18 and which share of  the
income distribution can be traced back to demographic groups? First we will present the
decomposition of the inequality measure by countries. Then we turn to the decomposition
by countries and household types to answer the question which of these characteristics is
the driving force for the observed income inequality in Euroland.
4.1 Decomposition by countries
Let us start with a closer inspection of the nations' population shares within the Euroland
income distribution. At first glance, the most striking feature are the great discrepancies
in population sizes across Euro countries as can be seen in Table 1.
We have Germany, France and Italy with an average population share of 20 percent and
more on the one hand. On the other hand, there are six very small countries that constitute
only 5 percent and less (Luxembourg with a share of a sixth of a percentage point) of the
Euroland population. Spain is in the middle ranks with 14 percent of all residents.
Population shares within the income deciles differ very much from these average country
means. However, there is no clear relationship between income distribution and absolute
country size. Instead, as one might expect, geography matters a lot. Whereas the central
or continental Euro countries are over-proportionally represented in the higher income
deciles, the Southern-European states Italy, Spain and Portugal (as well as Ireland in the
North) have larger shares in the lower income groups. For instance about 20 percent of all
households in the bottom decile and 42 percent of the top income decile of Euroland are
from Germany, that has an overall population share of 29 percent. The Portuguese on the
contrary, having a mean population share of 3.5 percent, constitute almost 11 percent of
the poorest and hardly more than 1 percent of the highest earners in Euroland.
The overall pattern of over- and under-representation of nationalities within the deciles
becomes even more visible by examining the standardized share of each country
according to its actual population size, the representation rate, over the Euroland income15
distribution. In Figures 1A and 2A (in the Appendix) the decile population shares are
standardized by each country's overall population share. A representation rate above 1
indicates that the country is responsible for more people in that income group than its
average population size would predict, hence this nation is over-represented in the
respective income class.
Table 1: Income distribution in Euroland (Deciles)
Income
G NL BE LU F IRL I S P A EURO
LAND
decile
Population share in %
1 20.1 3.2 2.4 0.04 8.6 1.2 26.2 26.0 10.6 1.7 100
2 13.2 2.2 2.3 0.02 14.6 2.6 31.7 25.4 6.6 1.6 100
3 20.7 5.1 2. 5 0.02 18.2 1.6 25.6 19.4 5.0 2.0 100
4 21.8 7.5 3.3 0.04 20.8 1.1 24.4 15.2 3.6 2.5 100
5 27.9 7.4 3.3 0.05 23.0 1.1 19.4 13.0 2.5 2.4 100
6 33.6 6.4 3.5 0.09 21.8 0.9 18.7 10.3 1.7 3.1 100
7 33.8 6.1 4.3 0.10 22.2 1.1 18.2 9.3 1.4 3.7 100
8 37.5 6.0 4.7 0.20 22.9 0.9 15.2 7.9 1.4 3.4 100
9 38.0 5.7 5.4 0.25 25.5 1.2 12.8 6.0 1.2 4.1 100
10 42.0 4.9 4.7 0.60 26.2 1.2 9.3 6.2 1.4 3.7 100
Mean 28.9 5.4 3.6 0.14 20.4 1.3 20.1 13.9 3.5 2.8 100
Source: Authors‘ calculations, ECHP (wave 1995)
In Figure 1A the graphs of the group of central Euro countries Germany, France,
Belgium, Austria and Luxembourg are clearly upward-sloping with increasing income
decile. They switch from under-representation to over-representation somewhere between
the fourth and the sixth decile. Luxembourg is an extreme case with a population share
lower than half its mean population share in the lower half of the income distribution and
a substantial over-proportional fraction in the highest decile. An exception to this central
European pattern are the Netherlands that, after a remarkable over-representation in the
fourth and fifth decile, experience a decrease of their population share in higher income
classes.16
Italy, Spain and Portugal also reveal a common downward-sloping pattern as illustrated
in Figure 2A: Whereas the lowest 30 to 40 percent of incomes are relatively often
received by Southern European residents, higher incomes are under-represented in these
countries. Among the poorer states of  Euroland, Ireland stands out of line due to its
relatively high level of social security protection in the bottom  deciles. With a most
pronounced over-representation in the second decile and a sharp drop thereafter the Irish
even improve their representation rate throughout the 40 percent highest income earners
from 0.7 to almost 1. In other words the share of Irish among Euroland's highest income
earners is almost equivalent to their average population share.
With this indirect information about the national structures of the income distribution we
now turn to the entropy measure and its more immediate since compressed indication of
inequality. Table 2 reveals how the Theil index of 0.18 for Euro10 can be decomposed by
the Euro countries' respective contributions to overall income inequality. Decomposition
by countries shows that the country inequality indices range from a minimum of 0.15
(Netherlands) to a maximum of 0.24 (Portugal).
Table 2: Sources of Euroland Inequality






Netherlands 0.1513 12,256 5.6 4.6
Austria 0.1518 13,582 3.2 2.6
France 0.1531 13,313 22.9 18.9
Germany 0.1568 13,777 33.6 28.5
Belgium 0.1603 13,487 4.1 3.6
Italy 0.1884 9,724 16.5 16.9
Luxembourg 0.1900 22,136 0.3 0.3
Spain 0.1942 8,831 10.3 10.9
Ireland 0.2326 11,249 1.2 1.5
Portugal 0.2446 7,617 2.3 3.0
Between countries - - - 9.3
Euroland 0.1849 11,845 100 100
Source: Authors‘ calculations, ECHP (wave 1995)17
We can broadly distinguish three groups of states. Income is most equally distributed in
the central or continental Northern European countries (Austria, France, Germany,
Netherlands) where the Theil index takes a value of  about 0.155 with a variation below 1
percent across countries. Also worth noting is that these countries have mean incomes
that are remarkably equal (12,000 to 14,000 ECU). Next comes the Southern European
group consisting of Italy and Spain plus Luxembourg as a geographical  outlier. The
inequality measures in this second group vary only a little around 0.19 whereas average
income levels deviate drastically. The "periphery" consisting of Ireland and Portugal
show greatest income inequality at about 0.24.
In terms of relative contributions we can see that the four largest countries Germany,
France, Italy and Spain make up 75 percent of the overall  Theil index. Differences
between countries also account for almost 10 percent of Euroland inequality. This leaves
only 15 percent to the remaining six countries. Interestingly, the actual income inequality
does not show great variation across countries. It is instead the economic weights of the
states that differ remarkably. The differences in economic weights are due to the
countries' mean income levels as well as their population sizes. By construction of the
Theil measure these weights play an important role in assessing an aggregate index for
Euroland. As a result Germany comes in first in terms of relative contributions although
its index is the fourth lowest of all country-Theils. Germany is responsible for a share of
28.5 percent of overall inequality, since it constitutes almost 30 percent of the Euroland
population. In contrast to this, Luxembourg brings up the rear by contributing only 0.3
percent of the aggregate measure despite its relatively high within-country income
inequality. This is due to its average population share under 0.14 percent of all Euroland
residents.
As noted earlier, the neglect of production within the household might lead to a bias in
the inequality measures presented, since our comparisons are based on earned market
income alone. If household production plays a greater role in Southern Europe and
Ireland inequality will actually be smaller and the difference to Central Europe will also
be smaller than the numbers suggest. This overestimation is confirmed by a sensitivity
analysis with different household equivalence scales. As soon as a higher weight is18
assigned to children, an indication for household production taking place, the indices
have slightly lower values. This especially applies to Ireland and Portugal.
4.2 Decomposition by countries and by demographic groups
After having accounted for the sources of Euroland inequality with respect to countries,
we now focus on a further decomposition of inequality by demographic groups/household
structures.
Table 3: Theil T(1) indices by country and household type
Age head of the household
‡ ‡60 <60 with children <60; no children All hh
Netherlands 0.1566 0.1074 0.1693 0.1513
Austria 0.1114 0.1389 0.1661 0.1518
France 0.1890 0.1346 0.1461 0.1531
Germany 0.1566 0.1528 0.1501 0.1568
Belgium 0.2009 0.1277 0.1636 0.1603
Italy 0.1968 0.1855 0.1742 0.1884
Luxembourg 0.2606 0.1483 0.1807 0.1900
Spain 0.1674 0.2179 0.1763 0.1942
Ireland 0.2884 0.1769 0.2380 0.2326
Portugal 0.2651 0.2405 0.2174 0.2446
Euroland 0.1962 0.1743 0.1772 0.1849
Source: Authors‘ calculations, ECHP (wave 1995)
We divide the population into households in which the head of the household is older
than 60 years and in those with younger heads. We also partition the younger households
into those with and those without children. With this admittedly very rough
categorization of households, we hope to capture the principle forces at work with respect
to aggregate Euroland inequality. We would like to determine whether household types or
country differences are primarily responsible for the observed structure of the income
distribution in the European Monetary Union.
The purpose of this  disaggregation is twofold. First we want to compare measured
inequality across all subgroups. Second we want to evaluate the contribution of each19
group to overall inequality. An additional question would be whether differences between
particular inequality measures can be explained by different structures of social security
expenditures in the ten member states.
Table 3 provides answers to the first question. For Euroland as a whole we can see that
households over 60 seem to have the most unequally distributed income. This may come
as something of a surprise since one might have expected the social security system to
work towards a more equalized income distribution in old age. But one also needs to bear
in mind that in many (at least continental European) social security systems, pension
payments are earnings-related and in this way reflect the cumulated unequal earnings of
people over their entire working lives. In most cases pension payments are related to past
gross earnings. In contrast to e.g. wage income, such pensions are not subject to
redistribution through the tax system, at least as long as they remain within the tax-free
allowance. In addition to public pensions, private security plans are fed by past unequal
incomes and so there are also those revenues that differ remarkably across older
households. The  Euroland  Theil index for this group amounts to 0.1962. This is in
contrast to young households with and those without children whose Theils have values
of 0.1743 and 0.1772. As a result inequality is over 12 percent larger among the elderly
than among the young. With regard to the individual country measures this pattern is true
for seven out of ten countries, with Luxembourg revealing the greatest inequality for
older households. The high  Theil measure for Luxembourg thus seems to be largely
driven by the income inequality within this household type.
Another finding is that income is generally more equally distributed among households
with children than among those without children. This pattern can also be observed in all
but three of the Euroland countries. One reason for this observation might lie in the broad
categorization of households. Since the last group comprises young couples or singles
who do not have children at the time of the interview, as well as parents of older children
who are above 16 years of age and therefore are not recognized as children anymore,
income might be quite heterogeneously distributed within this group. Of course, the
category “households with children” also includes both couples and single parents.
Nonetheless, inequality within this group seems to be of minor magnitude relative to the
other household types.20
When comparing the variation of group Theils of different countries, it becomes obvious
that in Germany and Italy the inequality index hardly differs across household types. The
overall Germany-Theil index even exceeds that of each subgroup meaning that measured
income inequality in Germany as a whole is relatively higher than within any of the
household types. Mean income levels however differ across subgroups with childless
households having the highest and children-households having the lowest income. As a
result, between-group inequality is responsible for the aggregate measure to exceed the
subgroup average.
Table 4: Sources of Theil T(1) indices by country and household type








    Contribution to country inequality in % Theil index
Netherlands 21.12 26.94 46.37 5.57 0.1517
Austria 19.36 33.59 40.11 6.94 0.1524
France 28.66 38.60 30.98 1.77 0.1540
Germany 24.55 35.43 37.41 2.61 0.1568
Belgium 31.93 34.76 31.38 1.92 0.1609
Italy 33.93 35.30 29.24 1.53 0.1885
Luxembourg 28.90 32.34 35.59 3.17 0.1902
Spain 26.12 46.39 25.72 1.76 0.1947
Ireland 29.70 38.32 26.13 5.85 0.2330
Portugal 28.09 41.64 28.08 2.18 0.2450
Variation between
countries %
9.08 8.99 10.40 9.30
Euroland 27.69 37.07 33.22 2.20 0.1849
Source: Authors‘ calculations, ECHP (wave 1995)
We now turn to the question of what is mainly shaping inequality in Euroland - whether it
is differences between household types or differences between countries. Table 4 tells us
that between-household-types inequality is responsible for 2.2 percent of the Euro10
measure while the contribution of between-country inequality amounts to 9.3 percent (see
Table 2). This leads us to the conclusion that differences between countries are to a
greater extent responsible for overall inequality in  Euroland than differences between
household types. This finding could be a point of departure for a common social policy in21
Euroland. Such a policy, rather than reducing the differences between demographic
groups  within countries, should be aimed at reducing income inequality between
household types across countries.
This conclusion is supported by the observation that there is large cross-country variation
of inequality indices within household types. Going back to Table 3, we see that
inequality for households over 60 varies between 0.11 in Austria and almost 0.29 in
Ireland. This span is significantly larger than the overall span (0.15 to 0.24) found in (4.1)
above. At the same time the between-group variation among these households is below
the overall between-country variation. This indicates that although inequality within this
demographic group varies a lot across countries, mean income differences seem to be of
minor magnitude.
The same holds true, though to a lower extent, for the Theil measure for households with
children. Here the T(1) index ranges between 0.11 in the Netherlands to 0.24 in Portugal.
That is, in the Netherlands households with children have a Theil index 60 percent below
the aggregate measure of 0.18 whereas Portuguese families face an income inequality
exceeding the  Euroland average by 30 percent. Again the mean income deviation
between countries accounts for 9 percent of overall inequality in this group.
Only for the last household type (household head under 60, no children) is the range of
country measures the same as for all household types together, although the relative
rankings of the countries differ. Most importantly, between country variation contributes
10.4 percent of the Euroland measure meaning that although the country indices do not
differ much, mean incomes do. Thus, convergence in social security among EMU
members might reduce inequality between countries disproportionately.
To develop some intuition for the differing indices, a look at European social security
payments is quite revealing (Europäische  Kommission 1999). That elderly people in
Ireland experience the greatest income inequality, deviating from the overall  Euroland
index by almost 56 percent, corresponds to its lowest share of social expenditures for
elderly people and surviving dependents in comparison to other EU countries. High
income inequality for Portuguese and Spanish households with children is consistent with
having the lowest per-capita payments to families and children, in particular lowest levels22
of child benefit payments, among the member states of the European union. In Spain the
share of social expenditures for families relative to GDP compared to the same figure for
the elderly reveals a ratio of 1:24. In comparison the ratio for Germany is 1:5 and for
Ireland it is 1:2.
The relationship between a country’s social security budget relative to GDP and its Theil
measure for the year 1994 can be seen in Figure 3A as a definitely pronounced negative
relationship. The higher social security payments in terms of GDP the lower is income
inequality. While this comparison does not tell us anything about the efficiency of social
security systems, it provides information on the degree of similarity among the Euroland
countries with respect to income inequality as well as to the role of the state.
Interestingly, the clustering of countries into three groups already noted with respect to
the inequality indices is also seen in the share of social security expenditures.
However, in order to gauge the impact of social transfer payments on the income
distribution within countries, it is useful to compare pre-transfer and post-transfer
incomes.
5 The redistributive impact of social transfers in Euroland
A comparison of the distribution of net total incomes (including social transfers)
standardized by a household equivalence scale with that of pre-government (but post-tax)
incomes indeed yields another striking result shown in Table 5. Prior to social transfer
payments hardly any differences in the (very high)  Theil measures exist between
countries. Government intervention not only reduces inequality but also appears to
intensify differences between countries. The variation of country  Theils even increases
after social transfer payments. It seems that more wealthy states (like the Benelux,
Germany or France) can afford to shift the incomes of their poor to a greater extent than
less wealthy states (like Ireland and Portugal) can; thereby enhancing the disparities in
country mean incomes. The relative contribution of between-country differences in
overall inequality rises substantially from 3.4 percent before transfers to 9.3 percent after
social transfer payments.23
While prior to transfers the relation between countries' mean incomes and their Theil
measures reveal little relationship to each other adding social protection we find the
correlation substantially more negative. We saw this relationship in the previous section
in Figure 3A in the Appendix. This supports the conjecture from earlier that richer
countries have more extensive social protection schemes in order to lower the gap
between high and low income earners. Of course this says nothing about the causality of
this relationship.
It is also interesting to note that there is a very high negative relationship between the
relative size of the redistribution (as measured by the ratio of post-government to pre-
government Theil) and the degree of social protection expenditures.
15 There is also no
clear relationship between pre-government mean income and the pre-government T(1),
while post-government mean income is strongly related to the post-government  Theil
index.









Netherlands 0.4333 5.4 0.1513 4.6
Austria 0.3942 2.8 0.1518 2.6
France 0.4122 21.1 0.1531 18.9
Germany 0.4146 32.0 0.1568 28.5
Belgium 0.4781 4.1 0.1603 3.6
Italy 0.4145 15.8 0.1884 16.9
Luxembourg 0.4492 0.3 0.19 0.3
Spain 0.4672 11.3 0.1942 10.9
Ireland 0.4932 1.4 0.2326 1.5
Portugal 0.4316 2.4 0.2446 3.0
Between countries 0.0149 3.4 0.0172 9.3
Euroland 0.4387 100 0.1849 100
Source: Authors‘ calculations, ECHP (wave 1995)
                                                                
15 The focus of this paper however is more on the variation of inequality measures depending on
government interventions than on an evaluation of the redistributive effects in European social transfer
systems as done in other studies (see e.g. Kraus 2000 and references therein).24
However, due to the lack of reliability and availability with respect to data on tax
payments within the ECHP these results need to be qualified, recalling that we are
looking at pre-transfer, but post-tax income. Thus at this point a government intervention
has already taken place and we are not in a position to measure its impact on inequality.
We can only assume that tax laws promote a redistribution of income towards more
equalization and therefore our analysis could underestimate the reduction of income
inequality through government intervention and hence only provides a lower bound for
an assessment of redistributive policy.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to study the pattern of real income inequality in Euroland.
Applying the Theil concept rather than simply comparing the countries’ nominal measures
thereby allows us to take into account between group variation and to assess the real
contribution of each member state or demographic group to the overall measure.
The Theil index of aggregate income inequality in Euroland is calculated to have a value
of 0.18. It was computed using the 1995-wave of the European Community Household
Panel , a new data set aimed at generating comparable social statistics at the EU level,
together with complementary data from the Luxembourg income study.
Decomposition by countries shows that the distinct inequality indices for net income
range from a minimum of 0.15 for the Netherlands to a maximum of 0.24 for Portugal.
Between-country differences make up 9 percent of overall inequality, an indication that
mean income levels still differ between the Euro countries. While the inequality measures
do not differ remarkably across countries, the countries' economic weights measured by
their income and population shares are responsible for a substantial fraction of overall
inequality. However, we found between-country variation to be substantially smaller
prior to social transfer payments, contributing only 3 percent to the Euroland index.
Further decompositions by household structure reveal great disparities between the
economic situations of different demographic groups across countries. Although
responsible for substantial variation of income within countries,  socio-economic
characteristics (as captured by our categorization into household types) seem to play a25
minor role in shaping inequality in Euroland as a whole. Between-household differences
make up only 2 percent of overall inequality, indicating that income seems to be quite
similarly distributed across demographic groups.
In summary, income inequality seems to be rather similar across the Euroland member
states. Nonetheless definite conclusions must await both deeper empirical analysis and
the building of consistent theory about income distribution, as e.g. proposed by
Gottschalk and  Smeeding (1997). Once we decompose the aggregate measures by
countries and by household types, we can find greater differences in the inequality
indices.
An interesting policy question would concern the effects of an expansion of Euroland to
other EU-members. The size of Euroland is not exogenously given or constant over time
but can be subject to changes of political will. Candidates are the EU countries that did
not join the European Monetary Union on January 1
st , 1999, i.e. Greece, United
Kingdom and Denmark
16. The data yield a  Theil T(1) of 0.1888 after extending the
sample to include the three above mentioned countries. This is an increase by 0.0039 or
approximately 2.1 percent, suggesting that social cohesion will slightly decline with such
a further extension of the European Monetary Union.
Future research on the subject would include an assessment of the dynamics of the
income distribution that includes income mobility as well as permanent income
inequality. It is also desirable to go in the direction of a deeper statistical and theoretical
(i.e. structural) modeling of income inequality. The first step would contribute to the
solution of the question whether the differences in income inequality revealed here are
significant in a statistical sense or not. The latter would help answering questions with
respect to the causal determinants of inequality.
                                                                
16 There were no data available in the ECHP for Sweden which is also a possible candidate for the
expansion of Euroland. Of course we could integrate Sweden into our analysis using LIS-data as shown in
this paper for Finland. Another interesting policy question would be to determine the consequences for
social cohesion of an enlargement that would include Eastern European countries like the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.26
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Appendix
Figure 1A: Income distribution in Euroland 












































Figure 2A: Income distribution in Euroland  
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